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Headage Of Politics and Paperwork The 9/11 warning 'nonstory' has apparently persisted long enough for Andrew Sullivan to be forced into more commentary this morning. He, along with William Safire and Democratic Representative Timothy Roemer, is right to call for an investigation into the 'nonfeasance' (Safire's term) of both the Clinton and Bush administrations. What I strongly disagree with is the assertion (as discussed with readers in private) that it is somehow only the Bush administration's 'incompetence' that needs to be investigated. The idea that it is solely the dropping of the intelligence ball by the current administration that must bear the blame for September 11 is demonstrably false and unsupported by the record. On February 13, 2001, Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive, “Organization of the National Security Council System” (NSPD-1). Among other things, it abolished the existing system of Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) and replaced it with a more streamlined structure. The IWGs coordinate information flow and activities between the various intelligence services and the Security Council as well as the intelligence services and other government bodies, such as the Department of Defense. NSPD-1 merged the existing Counter-Terrorism Security Group, Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group, Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness, Consequences Management and Protection Group, and the Interagency Working Group on Enduring Constitutional Government into a single National Security Council Policy Coordination Committee on Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness. On May 9, 2001, Bush issued NSPD-5, “Review of National Intelligence.” (The text hasn't been cleared for release yet, so read Washington Post coverage of it here.) NSPD-5 ordered a comprehensive review of US Intelligence. The review was intended to “ensure that U.S. intelligence capabilities are honed to serve us on a wide range of critical challenges that face us now and in the future.” George Tenet, Directory of Central Intelligence, was directed to name a panel of government officials, and (in conjunction with Condoleeza Rice, National Security Advisor) a panel of non-governmental experts. The panels were due to report to the President in the summer of 2001. I have read in Sullivan and elsewhere that the report was in fact 'on the President's desk' awaiting review and further action on September 10, but I have read no official (i.e. White House) confirmation of this. All presidents, upon assuming office, issue directives similar to NSPD-1. Such directives generally establish the means by which Presidential orders concerning matters of national security will be communicated, and establish a National Security Council structure, including who shall attend meetings. Clinton issued such a Presidential Decision Directive on January 20, 1993 (PDD-2). In it, Clinton directs that “The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory advisers to the NSC shall attend NSC meetings.” While President Clinton is named as a member of the Council, as required by law, neither he himself nor the Vice-President were required to attend. In NSPD-1, Bush directed that “The National Security Council (NSC) shall have as its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.” In other words, President Bush was to attend all NSC meetings. If he was absent from an NSC meeting, the Vice-President would preside at his direction. In Section D of PDD-2 (titled "Interagency Working Groups"), we read the final line of the directive: “The number of these working groups shall be kept to the minimum needed to promote an effective NSC system.” Under Clinton the “minimum required” to manage American Counter-terrorism efforts ballooned to six separate groups. In NSPD-1 Bush abolished the entire existing IWG system established by Clinton in PDD-2, and consolidated functions that Clinton had established with four other Directives and two Executive Orders. While PDD-2 is a standard type of Presidential Directive, Clinton never ordered anything even remotely equivalent in scope to NSPD-5’s mandated national intelligence review. The Counter-terrorism policy he issued in June of 1995 (PDD-39) was only a policy statement, with no real provision made for execution of that policy. If attempts were made to implement PDD-39, they were clearly unsuccessful. It was more of a political exercise than anything else, and its ambitious goals were never realized. In short, the record demonstrates that Bush was more directly involved with matters of national security than his predecessor and that he established his direct involvement as a matter of stated policy. NSPD-1 was both more exhaustive and more coherent than PDD-2. It firmly established detailed chains of command, trimmed away unnecessary bureaucratic redundancy, and even revised the method of issuing Presidential orders related to National Security that had been in place since the Nixon administration. Clearly, this was an issue that Bush was deeply concerned with, and he was taking steps to overhaul the system from top to bottom. Furthermore, NSPD-5 shows that Bush was aware of the existing problems in United States intelligence, and was taking steps to remedy them. The fact that time was against him is no fault of his, nor can Bush somehow be made responsible for the very nature of bureaucracy. Bush was attempting, as one of his major administrative priorities, to reform an existing National Security structure that not only impeded the flow of vital intelligence information to the Executive, but was also incapable of formulating effective responses to actual attacks against the country. People may continue to exercise 20/20 hindsight and insist that it was the incompetence and stupidity of the Bush administration that permitted 9/11 to happen. But they will do so without the support of the facts. Certainly, there is investigative work to be done, because it will help to remedy future intelligence failures. In order for that effort to be successful, the actions taken by the US government over at least the past decade must be examined. Focusing solely on Bush's perceived incompetence not only demonstrates bias, but will also fail to obtain the information needed to strengthen our security.
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